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"EVERYTHING PROMISED 
HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WRITING" 
INDIAN RESERVE FARMING AND THE SPIRIT AND INTENT 
OF TREATY SIX RECONSIDERED 
DEREK WHITEHOUSE~STRONG 
In December 2005, a Canadian federal court 
justice dismissed a six-hundred-million-dollar 
claim by the Samson Cree related to alleged 
mismanagement of its energy royalties. In 
newspaper interviews, a lawyer for the Samson 
Cree expressed disbelief and stated that the 
justice "discounted the testimony of our elders" 
and "followed essentially the word of the white 
man and the written word of the white man." 
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He continued: "It's as if the white man cannot 
be biased, but the Indians might be biased in 
their recounting of history."! Interestingly, 120 
years before the justice dismissed the Samson 
Cree case, the Canadian Department of Indian 
Affairs actively sought Indian2 testimony, 
believing that the oral accounts were more 
accurate than its own written records. 
In the mid-1880s, the Department of Indian 
Affairs launched an investigation into claims 
by Indian signatories to Treaty Six that the 
government was not honoring its treaty com-
mitments. Because its own records were flawed, 
the department instructed its employees to 
gather Indian recollections and oral testimo-
nies and relied on this information when it 
concluded that some treaty obligations did 
remain unfilled. However, when Indian sig-
natories in the same period claimed that the 
text of Treaty Six did not accurately reflect the 
spirit and intent of the negotiations and did 
not record all the obligations that they had 
extracted from the government, the depart-
ment did not seek Indian testimony to verify or 
refute the charges; rather, it relied solely upon 
its written records and it rejected the claims 
outright. Analyses of the spirit and intent of 
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Treaty Six must recognize that the Department 
of Indian Affairs' selective use of Indian recol-
lections and oral testimonies in the late nine-
teenth century reinforced both contemporary 
and current divergent understandings and 
perspectives about the spirit and intent of that 
document.3 
NEGOTIATION OF TREATY SIX: DICHOTOMY 
OF INTENT 
Events leading up to the negotiation of 
Treaty Six, and the negotiation itself, show 
that a dichotomy existed between the goals 
that the Canadian government and the Indian 
peoples hoped to achieve with the treaty. The 
Canadian government wanted to use the treaty 
process to facilitate peaceful Euro-Canadian 
settlement of western Canada by extinguish-
ing Indian title to the land and establishing 
a reserve system.4 It also believed that reserve 
agriculture and Euro-Canadian academic and 
religious instruction would mitigate the impact 
that disappearing bu(falo herds and advancing 
Euro-Canadian settlement would have on the 
Indian peoples of the prairies as well as hasten 
their absorption into Euro-Canadian society.5 
Although land pressures were the primary 
motivators behind the Canadian government's 
decision to treat with various bands, its limited 
annual budget and the national preoccupation 
with constructing a transcontinental railway 
limited its ability to act.6 The government 
therefore entered into treaty negotiations only 
when it deemed it necessary. Indeed, in 1871, 
when several of the bands that eventually 
signed Treaty Six expressed "feeling[s] of dis-
content and uneasiness" about their changing 
social and economic conditions and requested 
a treaty, the government declined.7 The gov-
ernment entered into discussions several years 
later, only after separate groups of Cree threat-
ened to disrupt survey and telegraph crews.8 
The text of Treaty Six was determined during 
negotiations at Fort Carlton and was agreed to 
on August 23, 1876: all subsequent adhesions 
required that signatories agree to the original 
text and the original obligations.9 
While the Canadian government entered 
into Treaty Six negotiations to facilitate Euro-
Canadian settlement and the economic and 
cultural absorption of the Indian populations, 
Indian negotiators intended to use the clauses 
contained in the treaty to protect their cultures 
and economies from the effects of settlement 
pressures and of diminishing buffalo herds. 
Chief Ahtukukkoop,10 one of the main nego-
tiators of Treaty Six, commented that 
[w]e have always lived and received our 
needs in clothing, shelter, and food from the 
countless multitudes of buffalo that have 
been with us since the earliest memory of 
our people. No one with open eyes and open 
minds can doubt that the buffalo will soon 
be a thing of the past. Will our people live 
as before when this comes to pass? No! They 
will die and become just another memory 
unless we find another way.ll 
Indeed, Ahtukukkoop pointed out that "[t]he 
mother earth has always given us plenty with 
the grass that fed the buffalo. Surely we Indians 
can learn the ways of living that made the 
whiteman strong."12 
For Ahtukukkoop and his fellow negotia-
tors, "the ways of living that made the white 
man strong" were rooted in agricultural pro-
duction, and they expected to use Treaty Six 
to transition their hunting-based economy to 
one based on farming in a reserve context. In 
making this transition, they were not content 
merely to survive in a subsistence lifestyle. 
Several years before the negotiations at Fort 
Carlton, future Treaty Six commissioner W. 
J. Christie informed Cree representatives that 
when they did sign a treaty with the govern-
ment they could expect to be treated "most lib-
erally" and that they would become "well off."13 
Indian negotiators at Fort Carlton therefore 
expected that the obligations that they secured 
under treaty would allow reserve populations 
to remain culturally independent from Euro-
Canadian society and to compete successfully 
in the agricultural economy of the Canadian 
prairies. 
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FIG. 1. Treaty with Saskatchewan Crees, 1876. Courtesy of Glenbow Archives, NA-1315-19, 
Glenbow Museum, Calgary, Alberta. 
To ensure that the government addressed 
their concerns, the Cree chiefs actively pre-
pared for the discussions held at Fort Carlton.14 
They were well aware of the intricacies involved 
in translating from one language into another, 
and rather than relying on individuals whom 
the government selected and employed, they 
hired Peter Erasmus as their interpreter. 15 
Consequently, when the government's rep-
resentatives informed the chiefs that federal 
interpreters would work at the proceedings 
and that Erasmus's services were not required, 
Mistowasis (who was another senior negotiator) 
cautioned, "I know what it takes to interpret," 
and threatened to leave if Erasmus was not 
permitted to translate.!6 Erasmus proved to be 
so superior to the government's own interpret-
ers (Peter Ballendine and treaty commissioner 
Reverend John A. Mackay)!7 that shortly into 
the negotiations Morris hired him to serve as 
the "chief interpreter, being assisted by the 
others."!8 
For their part, the Indian negotiators who 
were present at Fort Carlton in August 1876 
agreed to 
promise and engage that they will in all 
respects obey and abide by the law, and they 
will maintain peace and good order between 
each other, and also between themselves and 
other tribes of Indians, and between them-
selves and others of Her Majesty's subjects, 
whether Indians or whites, now inhabiting 
or hereafter to inhabit any part of the said 
ceded tracts, and that they will not molest 
the person or property of any inhabitant 
of such ceded tracts, or the property of 
Her Majesty the Queen, or interfere with 
or trouble any person passing or travelling 
through the said tracts, or any part thereof; 
and that they will aid and assist the officers 
of Her Majesty in bringing to justice and 
punishment any Indian offending against 
the stipulations of this treaty, or infringing 
the laws in force in the country so ceded.19 
Further, they agreed to "cede, release, sur-
render and yield up to the Government of 
the Dominion of Canada for Her Majesty the 
Queen and her successors forever, all their 
rights, titles and privileges whatsoever, to the 
lands" defined within the text of the document 
and "also all their rights, titles and privileges 
whatsoever, to all other lands, wherever situ-
ated, in the North-West Territories, or in any 
other Province or portion of Her Majesty's 
Dominions, situated and being within the 
Dominion of Canada."zo 
In return for these concessions, the Indian 
negotiators demanded "assistance to get estab-
lished in their new occupation of agriculture, 
not only financially, but also in instruction 
and management.'>21 The federal government 
made several commitments that were designed 
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to "encourag[el ... the practice of agriculture" 
and that established clear treaty obligations 
regarding the provision of money, seeds, imple-
ments, tools, and livestock to members of 
Indian reserves who were "engaged in cultivat-
ing the soil." The Canadian government com-
mitted to "lay aside reserves for farming lands 
... and other reserves for the benefit of the said 
Indians ... provided all such reserves shall not 
exceed in all one square mile for each family of 
five, or in that proportion for larger or smaller 
families." As well, the government agreed 
to establish "schools for instruction in such 
reserves hereby made, as to [Hl er Government 
of the Dominion of Canada may seem advis-
able, whenever the Indians of the reserve shall 
desire it.,,22 
While these and other considerations were 
similar to those that had been agreed to under 
the terms of Treaties Three, Four, and Five, 
they did not fully address the needs and con-
cerns of the Indian negotiators at Fort Carlton. 
Treaty Six was finali<:ed only once they had 
extracted additional considerations that they 
believed would ensure not only their cultural, 
economic, and physical survival but also their 
ability to prosper in the same economy as Euro-
Canadian farmers who settled in the West. The 
federal negotiators in turn agreed to these same 
concessions on the grounds that they would 
"help them [the Indiansl to cultivate the soil," 
thereby facilitating the goal of opening the 
prairie region to peaceful Euro-Canadian set-
tlement.23 
The Indian negotiators, for example, secured 
a promise from the government to provide eco-
nomic assistance should they be "overtaken by 
any pestilence, or by a general famine."24 They 
demanded this provision because they were 
concerned about "the ignorance of Indians in 
commencing to work the land,,25 and about 
their fate should their crops or other means of 
sustenance (including the rapidly disappearing 
buffalo herds) fail.26 Indeed, Mistowasis cau-
tioned the federal representatives that "[tlhis is 
no trivial matter with us.'>27 
Indian negotiators also recognized that 
because reserve farmers would have to devote 
significant amounts of time and energy to 
plowing, seeding, and cultivating the land, they 
would have limited ability to hunt and trap in 
the spring.28 The negotiators therefore insisted 
that the government provide reserve farmers 
with a secure source of "food in the spring."29 
Believing that this concession would assist 
treaty signatories in making the transition to 
reserve agriculture, the Canadian government 
agreed to provide one thousand dollars a year 
for three years for "the purchase of provisions 
for the use of such of the band as are actu-
ally settled on the reserves and are engaged 
in cultivating the soil, to assist them in such 
cultivation.,,30 Moreover, federal negotiators 
agreed that band members who were "actually 
engaged in farming land on the reserves . . . 
would be at liberty to hunt and trap on govern-
ment lands the same as before" and emphasized 
that the "things they would be getting would be 
a present on top of what they had before.,,31 
Treaty Six Indian negotiators also succeeded 
in increasing the government's tool, imple-
ment, and livestock obligations. At the start of 
the talks, Governor Morris offered to distribute 
the same numbers and proportions of animals 
and goods as called for by Treaty Three.32 The 
Indian negotiators at Fort Carlton, however, 
demanded additional considerations; they 
believed that the government's initial offer was 
insufficient to allow them to develop reserve 
agricultural systems that could survive and 
succeed when competing with Euro-Canadian 
farmers in the new prairie economy. Morris 
agreed to those requests that he believed would 
"encourage their desire to settle."33 Treaty Six 
therefore included the following provisions: 
to any band of the said Indians who are now 
cultivating the soil, or who shall hereafter 
commence to cultivate the land, that is 
to say: Four hoes for every family actually 
cultivating; also, two spades per family as 
aforesaid; one plough for every three fami-
lies, as aforesaid, one harrow for every three 
families as aforesaid; two scythes, and one 
whetstone and two hay forks and two reap-
ing-hooks for every family as aforesaid; and 
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also two axes, and also one cross-cut saw, 
and also one hand-saw, one pit-saw, the nec-
essary files, one grindstone and one auger 
for each band; and also for each Chief, for 
the use of his band, one chest of ordinary 
carpenter's tools; also for each band, enough 
of wheat, barley, potatoes and oats to plant 
the land actually broken up for cultivation 
by such band; also for each band, four oxen, 
one bull and six cows, also one boar and 
two sows, and one handmill when any band 
shall raise sufficient grain therefor; all the 
aforesaid articles to be given once for all for 
the encouragement of the practice of agri-
culture among the Indians.34 
Thus, while both negotiating parties saw 
Treaty Six as a means of encouraging and 
developing reserve agriculture, they differed 
markedly about the ends that were desired. The 
Canadian government expected the treaty to 
facilitate the economic and cultural absorption 
of the Indian signatories into Euro-Canadian 
society; the Indian signatories saw the treaty 
as a tool to help them maintain their cultural 
identities and develop a successful reserve-based 
agricultural system that would enable them to 
maintain their economic independence in the 
face of Euro-Canadian settlement. 
TRANSLATION AND SIGNING 
OF TREATY SIX 
Despite the fact that the federal treaty party 
also employed Peter Erasmus to interpret during 
the Treaty Six negotiations, the Cree chiefs 
continued to express confidence in his honesty 
and ability, and invited him to attend their 
private councils.35 Indeed, while some Cree 
negotiators accepted Morris's word that all the 
points they had raised with the treaty com-
missioners were included in the written text 
of Treaty Six, others were more cautious and 
relied on Erasmus for verification. Mistowasis 
requested that Erasmus "keep a close watch on 
the wording to see that it included everything 
that had been promised." Erasmus informed 
Mistowasis "that everything promised had 
been included in the writing" and with this 
assurance Mistowasis signed the document.36 
Although Erasmus was the lead translator 
during the negotiations, the government's 
records show that Ballendine, Mackay, James 
McKay, and W. J. Christie also served as 
translators for the federal treaty party.37 Their 
responsibilities included "watching how the 
answers [to questions raised by the Indian 
negotiators] were rendered [by Erasmus], and 
correcting when necessary." They confirmed 
that "[t]he Crees accepted the revised propos-
als [after the] ... treaty was interpreted to 
them carefully, and was then signed, and the 
payment made in accordance therewith."38 
At Fort Pitt, Morris continued the pattern 
of promoting reserve agriculture as the best 
means of ensuring the physical and economic 
survival of Indian peoples in the Treaty Six 
area, and he offered to teach the Cree "the 
cunning of the white man."39 Arguing that the 
economic future of the prairie region was tied 
to the success of settled agriculture, Morris 
noted that the Numbered Treaties provided the 
means and opportunities for Indian signatories 
to compete in that economy. He recounted 
how 
we had come at their own r~quest, and 
that there was now a trail leading from 
Lake Superior to Red River, that I saw it 
stretching on thence to Fort Ellice, and 
there branching off, the one track going 
to Qu'Appelle and Cyprus Hills, and the 
other by Fort Pelly to Carlton, and thence I 
expected to see it extended, by way of Fort 
Pitt to the Rocky Mountains; on that road 
I sawall the Chippewas and Crees walking, 
and I saw along it gardens being planted and 
houses built. I invited them to join their 
brother Indians and walk with the white 
men on this road.40 
Morris then offered the Indian peoples who 
had gathered at Fort Pitt "the same terms" as 
had been agreed to at Fort Carlton.41 
Erasmus (now in the sole employ of the fed-
eral treaty party) and his assistants explained 
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the terms of the treaty to the Indian nego-
tiators at Fort Pitt, and the negotiators them-
selves acknowledged that Mistowasis and 
Ahtukukkoop would have acted in the best 
interests of their peoples. Furthermore, when 
Chief James Seenum attempted to expand on 
the treaty obligations, Morris informed him 
and the other chiefs and headmen who were 
in attendance that it was not in his power "to 
add clauses to this treaty." The text of Treaty 
Six that was negotiated and translated at Fort 
Carlton could not be changed by subsequent 
signatories.42 
The treaty talks at Fort Pitt, however, 
revealed that the federal interpreters were not 
capable of accurately conveying some of the 
subtleties within Indian speeches. At Fort Pitt, 
Chief Big Bear expressed concern that the 
declining buffalo herds threatened his people's 
hunting economy and that the loss of their 
main source of sustenance would mean the end 
of their freedom. The federal interpreter (pos-
sibly Reverend John A. Mackay)43 translated 
Big Bear's speech to Morris as a request to "save 
me from what I most dread, that is: the rope to 
be about my neck (hanging)." This translation 
caused the Canadian officials to view Big Bear 
in a very negative light, and led Morris to chas-
tise him and suggest that "[tlhe good Indian 
need never be afraid" to have "the rope about 
his neck.'>!4 
Historian Hugh A. Dempsey, however, has 
shown that Big Bear's concern was not the 
fear of hanging but rather of being leashed. 
Big Bear used the metaphor of having a rope 
about his neck to highlight his concerns that 
the destruction of the buffalo would diminish 
the ability of his people to live and act freely.45 
It was in this context that Big Bear called for 
the protection of the remaining herds so "that 
there may be enough for all.'>!6 
Indeed, Morris himself later informed his 
superiors that the subject of preserving the buf-
falo "was constantly pressed on my attention 
by the Indians" during the Treaty Six negotia-
tions. Believing that "a few simple regulations 
would preserve the herds for many years," 
Morris "promised [them] that the matter would 
be considered by the North-West Council.'>!7 
Thus, when Morris answered Big Bear's request 
"that there be no hanging" with the response 
that "[tlhe Queen's law punishes murder with 
death, and your request cannot be granted," 
the chief (who was not aware that an error in 
translation had occurred and who likely was 
confused by the governor's response) took this 
to mean that the government would help to 
protect the buffalo. He informed Morris that the 
chiefs who were present at the Fort Pitt negotia-
tions "will help us to protect the buffalo, that 
there may be enough for all. I have heard what 
was said, and I am glad we are to be helped.'>!8 
In a separate incident, a third party informed 
Peter Erasmus that Chief Seenum had mis-
understood the amount of land that he and 
his people were entitled to under the terms of 
Treaty Six and that he had signed the Treaty 
Six document not realizing this error.49 
Thus, the government's translators experi-
enced some difficulty in accurately conveying 
the terms, spirit, and intent of the negotiating 
parties. For the federal treaty party, the impact 
of errors in translation was not necessarily 
severe: the government could and did refer to 
the text of the treaty (which was written in 
English) if any issues or concerns arose. For the 
Indian negotiators, however, the consequences 
of faulty and inadequate translations were 
more dire: because most neither spoke nor read 
English fluently, they relied on interpreters to 
accurately convey to them the exact wording, 
meaning, and intent of the negotiations and of 
the treaty text. 
TERMS, SPIRIT, AND INTENT OF TREATY SIX: 
DIVERGENCE OF UNDERSTANDING 
This reliance on interpreters and the 
recording of the treaty terms and proceed-
ings in a written language that was foreign 
to one of the two main negotiating parties 
led to a divergence in the understandings of 
the terms, spirits, and intent of Treaty Six. 
When the Indian and federal parties signed 
Treaty Six, they believed that the agreed upon 
amounts and types of livestock, implements, 
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and tools would be sufficient to allow Indian 
farmers to adapt successfully to a reserve-based 
agricultural system. Nevertheless, they were 
aware that the needs of reserve farmers might 
increase or change as they shifted their atten-
tion toward agriculture and away from hunting, 
trapping, and fishing. Indian negotiators signed 
Treaty Six with the belief that the Canadian 
government had "pledged itself to put them in 
the same position as the white man" and that it 
would (if necessary) adjust the treaty obligations 
to achieve this goal. 50 Indeed, Ahtukukkoop 
raised this point during the initial treaty nego-
tiations at Fort Carlton and requested that band 
members "be helped when they settle" and that 
the government give them "proportionate help 
as they advanced in civilization."51 
While the written records do not show 
Governor Morris addressing this point during 
treaty negotiations, he did commit the govern-
ment to "give them provisions to aid them while 
cultivating, to the extent of one thousand dol-
lars per annum, but for three years only"; he 
expected that after three years, Indian farm-
ers would be established and "able to support 
themselves."52 Morris also pledged, however, 
that "you need not concern yourselves so much 
about what your grand-children are going to 
eat; your children will be taught, and then they 
will be as well able to take care of themselves as 
the whites around them."53 
While Morris specifically was referring 
to the provision of schools, Erasmus and the 
Indian negotiators viewed the statement in 
the context of reserve agriculture. Of the same 
conversation, Erasmus recalled Morris saying, 
"You will get the seed and you need not con-
cern yourselves about what your children will 
eat. They will be taught and able to look after 
themselves."54 The governor's words thus con-
firmed the Cree belief that the terms of Treaty 
Six were not geared toward promoting subsist-
ence level agricultural production; rather, they 
were to provide Indian farmers, their children, 
and subsequent generations with the means of 
becoming "well off." 
This divergence of understanding is impor-
tant, because historian Sarah Carter has shown 
that Treaty Six obligations proved to be wholly 
inadequate for the large-scale dry-farming 
methods that many Euro-Canadian farmers 
adopted once they became familiar with local 
soil and climate conditions. 55 Indeed, less than 
five years after the signing of Treaty Six, Indian 
commissioner Edgar Dewdney suggested that if 
Indian farmers were to succeed, they required 
much greater assistance than written treaty 
terms provided. In 1881, he reported that "[tlhe 
want of more teams and implements is felt by 
the Indians from one end of the territory to the 
other" and that "it is found that the number of 
cattle and implements promised by the treaty 
is insufficient." Dewdney believed that even 
though Treaty Six was "a little more liberal" 
than the earlier Numbered Treaties, its terms 
were not sufficient to promote the type of 
reserve agriculture and the level of independ-
ence that the Canadian and Indian framers of 
the treaty had intended. Consequently, in addi-
tion to recommending that the government 
give Indian farmers more animals than were 
called for under written the terms of Treaty 
Six, he also suggested adopting a broader policy 
of providing one plow to each family "who 
satisfied the Agent that by their industry they 
could become [settled and independentl."56 
The government's own officials confirmed 
that "[ilt will be necessary in order to give the 
Indians a fair chance to earn their living by 
farming to furnish them with more oxen than 
are stipulated for in the Treaty.,,57 The depart-
ment therefore agreed to "liberally assis [tl" 
individuals and families by providing them 
with larger quantities and different types of 
tools 'and livestock than were called for under 
the terms of Treaty Six.58 
Several chiefs, however, charged that the 
government had failed to honor even those 
promises that were expressly stated in the 
written terms of Treaty Six. In the decade 
that followed the negotiations at Fort Carlton, 
Antoine of the Chipewyans of Heart Lake 
frequently demanded that the Department of 
Indian Affairs distribute quantities of imple-
ments and livestock that were outstanding. 59 
Chief Seenum and his councillors also accused 
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FIG. 2. Fort Carlton. Courtesy of Glenbow Archives, NA-675-1, Glenbow Museum, 
Calgary, Alberta. 
the department of riot honoring treaty obliga-
tions, and six years after he signed the treaty he 
informed Indian inspector T. P. Wadsworth that 
"we were told that every 3 families should have 
one plough, but we are far short of that.'>60 
Moreover, the Indian farmers themselves 
recognized that the treaty provisions were 
not suited to the realities of farming in the 
Canadian prairies. Because they had signed 
Treaty Six with the expectation that as their 
farming needs evolved, so too would the equip-
ment provided by the government, Mistowasis, 
Ahtukukkoop, and other Cree chiefs informed 
the department that they had "grievances to 
consult over." In 1884, the chiefs asked that 
"all Treaty provisions should be fulfilled." They 
listed numerous instances where they believed 
that the government had not honored its writ-
ten treaty obligations, including 
• that "the cattle given them are insuf-
ficient for them to gain their livelihood" 
• that the government should replace the 
work oxen and cows that it had provided 
because they were not suited to farm work 
• that the horses and wagons provided 
were not suited for use as personal convey-
ances for chiefs 
• that when treaty adherents experienced 
hunger and destitution, the government 
had failed to provide "liberal assistance" as 
required under the terms of Treaty Six.6l 
The chiefs also claimed that "there is not 
enough of anything supplied to them to enable 
all to farm." Consequently, they stated that 
because the government "told [them] that they 
would see how the white man lived, and would 
be taught to live like him," and because "the 
Govmt pledged itself to put them in the same 
position as the white man," the government 
should provide Indian farmers with "threshing 
mills, mowers, reapers, and rakes" similar to 
those used by Euro-Canadian farmers. 62 
THE DEPARTMENT'S SELECTIVE USE OF 
ABORIGINAL TESTIMONY 
When presented with these charges, Indian 
Affairs officials requested that their agents 
"EVERYTHING PROMISED HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE WRITING" 33 
in the field determine if the department had 
provided livestock, implements, and tools in 
sufficient quantities to fulfill federal treaty 
obligations.63 Even before local Indian agents 
submitted their replies, however, the superin-
tendent general informed the Indian commis-
sioner that "so far as the actual quantity and 
description of implements as well as of food 
given to them and the value of the same are 
concerned, they have received very much more 
than the Treaty ever intended that they should 
receive."64 
Federal officials, however, had neither a 
valid nor a defensible basis for making this 
statement. For contemporaries in the nine-
teenth century, tracking the implements and 
livestock that had been distributed toward 
fulfilling the government's treaty obligations 
was an imprecise endeavour at best. Indian 
agents and farm instructors often proved inca-
pable of keeping accurate records65 and many 
failed to submit their returns and reports on 
time or even at al1.66 Furthermore, the govern-
ment acknowledged that "for many reasons" 
its "system of recording cattle &c." was "most 
imperfect" because it had "gradually developed, 
as the requirements of the service have been 
discovered."67 The lists of "Appropriations" 
and "Expenditures" that appeared in the 
Department of Indian Affairs' annual reports, 
for example, reported what implements, tools, 
and livestock were distributed at the treaty 
level, but they rarely identified specific reserves 
as receiving specific treaty obligations.68 As 
a result, department officials admitted that it 
would be "very difficult" to generate any sort of 
report that accurately tabulated this informa-
tion.69 
The government thus was aware of sig-
nificant limitations and shortcomings in its 
recordkeeping system and acknowledged that 
it was not in a position to provide a satisfactory 
response to mounting criticisms that it was 
not fulfilling its obligations. In 1883, federal 
officials therefore recommended that Indian 
commissioner Dewdney "send in a statement 
showing the different Bands in that Treaty 
[Treaty Six] among which the said cattle &c. 
have been distributed as well as a statement 
showing what things are still due to those 
Indians under Treaty stipulations & also the 
articles which have been given over and above 
those promised by Treaty."7o One year later, 
in response to the aforementioned charges 
leveled by Mistowasis, Ahtukukkoop, and the 
other Cree chiefs, the superintendent general 
of Indian Affairs wrote that "I should be glad 
to be informed of the result of his [Dewdney's] 
enquiries as regards each of the matters of com-
plaint ... in so far as the same form part of the 
stipulations contained in the Treaty made with 
these Indians."71 
By 1885, however, Dewdney informed the 
superintendent general of Indian Affairs that 
because many of the records that detailed 
which Treaty Six bands had received what 
treaty obligations were "inaccurate," it would 
be necessary to "visit ... each band of Indians 
and [make] close enquiries ... among them.'>72 
He observed from past experience that when 
"making enquiries from the Indians over a cup 
of tea and a pipe of tobacco they could recall 
nearly all issues to their memory, that is of the 
cattle, horses and larger articles such as plows, 
harrows, etc:-of course as to axes, hoes and 
such like more difficulty was experienced."73 
Dewdney thus placed as great, if not greater, 
stock in the oral histories and personal rec-
ollections of Indian peoples with respect to 
treaty obligations than he did in the written 
records of his own department. He informed 
the superintendent general that he hoped that 
this personal investigation, combined with the 
information that was "already on hand will no 
doubt enable me to complete a return which 
will prove satisfactory to the Department."74 
In the fall of 1885, representatives of the 
Department of Indian Affairs were able to meet 
with the chiefs and headmen of the Treaty Six 
bands. As Dewdney had foreseen, all parties 
reached a consensus about what "[i]mplements, 
tools, cattle, &c." the inhabitants of the 
Indian reserves "had received from the Indian 
Department" up to and including December 
31, 1884.75 While these returns showed that 
many Treaty Six bands in fact had received 
34 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 2007 
their full allotment of treaty tools, implements, 
and livestock,76 they also showed that in a 
large number of situations the government in 
fact had not fulfilled its treaty obligations.?7 
Moreover, department officials admitted that 
some of the implements that had been distrib-
uted in fulfillment of treaty obligations were of 
inferior quality.78 
In addition to investigating the claims 
that Indian signatories to Treaty Six had not 
received their allotted treaty tools, implements, 
and livestock, the department also responded 
to the suggestions that the government had 
"pledged itself to put ... [the Indians] in the 
same position as white men, and that therefore 
they should be given threshing mills, mowers, 
reapers and rakes" and that "a living by agri-
culture was promised them (the Indians).,,79 
Referring directly "to the Treaty and to the 
negotiations as officially reported that took 
place when the Treaty was being concluded," 
the superintendent general stated that "I cannot 
find that any of t~ promises claimed under 
these heads were really made to the Indians,,8o 
and considered the case to be closed. 
CONCLUSION 
According to the letter of the treaty, the 
department's position was valid: there were 
no clauses within the treaty that required the 
government to provide additional or differ-
ent types or quantities of tools, livestock, and 
implements if farming requirements changed. 
The department's own written records never-
theless show that Mistowasis, Ahtukukkoop, 
and other chiefs signed Treaty Six believing 
that the government had committed to helping 
them develop successful reserve agricultural 
systems and to continuing providing them with 
assistance to achieve that end as their needs 
changed. The fact that the government merely 
consulted the written documents that were 
readily available and dismissed their claims 
without an in-depth investigation is curious 
given its own experiences and practices with 
other related contemporary issues. The gov-
ernment, for example, had incorrectly assumed 
that the complaints of Seenum, Mistowasis, 
Ahtukukkoop, and others that it was not ful-
filling obligations that were explicitly stated 
in the text of Treaty Six were false; federal 
officials later determined through direct inter-
views with the Indian claimants that some 
bands had not received their full allotment of 
treaty livestock, tools, and implements. Indeed, 
the government's inability to provide accurate 
data relating to the distribution of treaty obli-
gations and its reliance on Indian statements 
and recollections to provide that information 
demonstrated the flawed nature of its own 
written records and the value and accuracy of 
Indian testimony. It is in this light that one 
must view Indian claims that the written text 
of Treaty Six does not reflect the true spirit and 
intent of the negotiations and does not accu-
rately record all of the concessions that they 
had extracted from federal negotiators at Fort 
Carlton. 
NOTES 
Author's note: Although the main focus of 
this essay is on the Treaty Six area, the impact 
of Department of Indian Affairs' policies was felt 
throughout the Canadian West. Consequently, 
documents relating to Numbered Treaties One 
through Five also were reviewed and cited in this 
paper. Minor parts of this article are based on an 
unpublished paper I prepared for the Enoch Cree 
Nation in Alberta and for the law firm of Ackroyd, 
Piasta, Roth, and Day in Edmonton, Alberta. All 
parties have granted permission to publish part of 
that paper in its current form. 
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